Venezuela’s upstream reopening is accelerating. Established international operators are expanding their positions, new players are entering the market and North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP) has been granted a much larger role through a framework covering 17 producing and development areas. But the increasingly ambitious production targets should not be confused with barrels that can reach the market quickly.

Rystad Energy expects Venezuela’s recovery to remain gradual and predominantly brownfield-led through the end of this decade. Existing fields offer the shortest route to incremental production through well reactivations, workovers, infill drilling and facility rehabilitation. Large-scale greenfield development in the Orinoco Belt is a much longer-cycle proposition requiring substantial capital, drilling and new infrastructure.

NABEP illustrates both the opportunity and the challenge. According to the company, production across its Venezuelan operations has risen from around 18,000 barrels per day (bpd) to more than 200,000 bpd in roughly two years, supported by approximately $1 billion of investment. Its three existing production participation contracts appear to have increased combined output from around 90,000 bpd at the end of 2024 to close to 200,000 bpd currently, led by Petrozamora, with additional gains from Petrocedeño and Petrosur/Junín Sur.

That performance demonstrates how quickly underinvested producing fields can respond when capital and operating activity return. However, replicating it across a much larger portfolio is considerably more demanding.

NABEP’s proposed $100 billion investment program should therefore be viewed as a long-term funding requirement rather than near-term committed expenditure. Financing is expected to be raised progressively through equity, debt and partnerships, while the production ramp will require a parallel rebuilding of Venezuela’s upstream supply chain.

The broader reopening is also gaining momentum. Chevron has expanded its position and outlined more than $7 billion of investment over five years. Eni has assumed operatorship of Junín 5 under a new 25-year production participation contract, while Repsol has regained operational control at Petroquiriquire. Shell, GeoPark, Hunt Oil and Fluxus are among other operators entering or expanding their Venezuelan exposure.

Together, these developments could support a meaningful production recovery. Rystad Energy’s current scenario sees Venezuelan crude output rising to around 1.6 million bpd by 2028 and 1.8 million bpd by 2030, provided capital deployment, rig availability and oilfield-service capacity scale sufficiently. Most incremental barrels during this period are expected to come from existing assets operated by NABEP, Chevron, Eni, GeoPark and others.

The production mix begins to change in the next decade. Projects such as Chevron’s Ayacucho 8 and Carabobo acreage, Eni’s Junín 5 expansion and NABEP’s new Orinoco blocks will require development planning, drilling and infrastructure build-out before they can contribute material volumes. In Rystad Energy’s modeled upside scenario, potential Venezuelan production could reach around 2.6 million bpd by 2035, with the upside almost evenly divided between brownfield and greenfield additions.

Further upside is possible as new entrants emerge, including Continental Resources, a potential ExxonMobil return and a Turkish-backed operator. But the pace will remain conditional on actual capital deployment and Venezuela’s ability to rebuild drilling, services and infrastructure capacity.

The main constraint is increasingly execution rather than resource availability.

Only two active drilling rigs were reported by Baker Hughes in Venezuela in August, although this understates workover activity. Against that low base, Venezuela’s Hydrocarbons Ministry has indicated a requirement for around 93 rigs by 2028. Rystad Energy estimates approximately 50 rigs could be required by 2028 and almost 80 by 2030 to support the modeled production trajectory. Mobilizing those rigs also requires crews, refurbishment capacity, logistics and supporting oilfield services.

Historical well performance reinforces the case for caution. NABEP’s existing portfolio contains mature, pressure-depleted Lake Maracaibo assets where productivity depends heavily on pressure support, artificial lift and aging infrastructure. Years of underinvestment have created significant rehabilitation opportunities, but also mean production cannot be restored simply by adding capital.

Venezuela, therefore, has a plausible route back toward materially higher production, and the widening pool of operators increases the probability that capital will return. But the recovery will come in stages. Brownfield rehabilitation can move the needle this decade; returning Venezuela toward its historical production potential will ultimately depend on whether operators can finance, build and execute the much larger Orinoco developments in the 2030s.