From fuels to factories: The new shape of energy security
Let’s talk energy and look at how the world is navigating today’s energy challenges and what they might mean for the future energy system through the lens of Rystad Energy's fifth annual Global Energy Scenarios report.
Episode description
Let’s talk energy and look at how the world is navigating today’s energy challenges and what they might mean for the future energy system through the lens of Rystad Energy's fifth annual Global Energy Scenarios report. This year has been a continuous stream of energy shocks. Wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have disrupted energy flows and caused damage to critical infrastructure and, needless to say, prices have been volatile. The AI boom has tested the ability of power producers to meet surging demand just as extreme weather has challenged the grids that deliver it. All the while, governments and consumers have ushered in what many are calling a new era of energy pragmatism, pushing worries about energy security and affordability to the top of an agenda that had been dominated by climate and emissions.
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How do these ongoing shocks compare to the historical ones that have shaped our energy system to date and what could be their lasting impact?
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What do changing attitudes mean for the pace and scope of the energy transition?
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And will the price of energy – whether that’s petrol or power – get cheaper or more expensive in the future?
Featured in this episode
Transcript
Let's Talk Energy — Episode 52 From fuels to factories: The new shape of energy security Wednesday, 18 November 2026 SPEAKERS NB Noah Brenner — Host JH Jo Husebye — Head of Carbon Scenarios, Rystad Energy [00:00] [00:24] NB This is Let's Talk Energy, your go-to podcast for smart energy insights. I'm Noah Brenner. This year has been a continuous stream of shocks to the energy system. Wars in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have disrupted energy flows and caused damage to critical infrastructure. Needless to say, prices have been volatile. The AI boom has dusted the ability of power producers to meet surging demand, just as extreme weather has challenged the grids that deliver it. All the while, governments and consumers have ushered in what many are calling a new era of energy pragmatism, pushing worries about energy security and affordability to the top of an agenda that had been dominated by climate and emissions. So, how do these ongoing shocks compare to the historical ones that have shaped our energy system to date, and what could be their lasting impacts? What do changing attitudes mean for the pace and scope of the energy transition? And finally, will the price of energy, whether that's petrol or power, get cheaper or more expensive in the future? To help us separate the signal from the noise and the cyclical fluctuations from the structural changes, I'm joined today from Oslo by Jo Husebye, head of carbon scenarios at Rystad Energy, and lead author of our annual Global Energy Scenarios report. Jo, welcome to the program. [01:37] JH Thank you, Noah. Pleasure to be here. [01:39] NB Well, let's talk energy. The theme of this year's report is resilience, and I want to start there. I mean, I was struck by something you said earlier. You said, quoting here, we're definitely writing energy history as we speak. And so, how does the war in the Middle East right now compare to maybe some of these other energy shocks that have that have kind of influenced where we are today? And how has the system shown that resilience? [02:03] JH I think we are definitely writing history, and it makes it relevant to look back in history as well, right? So, if we start with the with the current crisis, volumetric wise, this is really the biggest supply disruption the oil markets has ever seen. Before the war, you know, around 20 million barrels a day of crude and oil products passed through the Strait, around 20% of total consumption. Similar, actually, share of LNG consumption, and even after the, you know, some bypass routes through Saudi and UAE, and some variable flows through the Hormuz, this has been a much larger disruption than both the Arab oil embargo in '73 and the Iranian revolution in '79. So volumetric-wise, definitely. But I guess on the price side, it has been the reactions has been smaller, and in that sense, not as record high, you might say. In the 70s, the oil prices really, you know, they quadrupled during the first oil embargo. So a much more serious price reaction back then. And after, you know, it actually doubled again when the roughly when the Iranian Revolution came a couple of years after, this year I think the Brent average now is around $95 a barrel, which is even below the 2022 average, and then far below where we were in 2011 and 2013. So that gives some historical context. The volume disruption massive, prices not the biggest. [03:40] NB Why have the prices been so muted? If we've got a record volume impact, why haven't we seen a record price impact? [03:48] JH If we go back to the 1970 crisis, right after that, we the creation of IEA was a consequence of that. More emergency oil stocks, and many of the OECD countries and others were better prepared now than before with storage, so that's one lesson. But I think also coming into this, we had quite some other shock absorbers. We really entered the year, and we made quite a lot of point of this in January that this is the year of surplus supply, both for oil and gas. You would say ironically almost because it didn't really turn that way, but that is an important reason for why the markets handled as well. It was rather, you know, we had a lot of supply and strong inventories, but also the fact that some of these pipes that I talked about has been into work. So, but we also, despite this, have seen severe demand destruction, right? So, by all means, it has been severe responses throughout both on supply, storage, and demand. But I think what many says, and I think now think of it more as a product crisis actually than crude prices, since the product prices has driven much higher than crude, we see that in particular with diesel, and I think the part of that is really that these two conflicts, both in Hormuz and we're in Iran and the Russian-Ukraine war, has kind of come on top of each other when it comes to diesel, for example. [04:00] [05:14] NB You mentioned crude prices have held up quite well. Diesel prices here, I mean, we hit records in the U.S. massive election issue here in the recent midterm elections, and so you know a very different, very different situation when it comes to products, as you pointed out. But I guess what I'm wondering is, you know, which of these impacts are maybe more short-term, and you've highlighted some of the changes that have come about due to these energy shocks in the 70s, and so you know what might what might be some of the longer-term impacts of the shocks that we're seeing today? [05:45] JH Us working with outlooks, that's really what we try to ask ourselves continuously. Like these shocks, what are really the long-term ramifications here? And I think we can see contours of some. And even though it's still quite early, if we start on the supply side, clearly you know the short-term impact is really that we see in the use of these pipelines in the Middle East that has been created for a reason and really showed their value. We also see responses, of course, outside the region due to prices. Like U.S. shale is also responding, so we see those short-term impacts. If we think about more long-term implications for supply, it is quite clear now that there are plans to expand pipeline capacity out of the region, and they're you know doubling up on the current capacities. You know, UAE have a second pipeline to Fujairah coming online already next year, and there are quite many others on the drawing board. So I think that will be a structural change. Another supply change you can discuss how long and to what extent it will remain is that there will probably be a security premium on barrels outside these choke points. And the question is, you know, how for how long and how high. On the storage side, I think it's also you know the impact we've seen and quite surprised is the ability for China to bring down their crude imports in their behavior, more like a swing crude importer, you might say. On the other end, there are other economies that has struggled more and bit more. Let's say got their lesson that perhaps many other countries got in the 70s, that you need strategic reserves, perhaps not only for crude, but also for products. So I think we see, long term, quite many initiatives to increase strategic storage, both on crude and products. And finally, of course, on demand. I think we can talk a bit about that later as well, perhaps. But you know, most of the demand reduction we've seen we don't consider structural. You know, fewer flights in the Middle East, switching from gas to coal, or you know, reducing output from the petrochemical sectors, etc. We expect these to come back. But there are also, of course, some structural shifts that are accelerated, and we can mention, you know, record high EV sales globally. China moving ahead with electric truck electrification, reaching their 2030 target actually of 40% new sales already this year. So it's a massive ramp up. We shouldn't give it all to this crisis, I think. But the fact that some of these structural trends are being accelerated, I think it's fair. Anything surprise you about how the system has responded to this? I guess I'll say somewhat unprecedented level of disruption. Like I mentioned, perhaps the Chinese swing behavior is at least new for many. You know, they are by far the biggest crude importer in the world, around 12 million barrels plus minus a day. So really, a significant crude importer, and that dropped all the way to seven, around seven in just a couple of months in June, a cut of 40%, which is both in relative and absolute terms, a real significant crude market impact. Right. So, the fact that they did that draw their crude stocks, they have been of course actively building strategically also ahead of this, combined with you know long runs on some of their industrial facilities like petrochemicals and also some switching of feedstock. I think that has shown that the biggest crude importer provides valuable flexibility to the oil market. [08:00] [09:30] NB Yeah, it's been we've been so focused as a swing. The idea of a swing producer is quite well known. The idea of a swing consumer is not been talked about to this point. [09:40] JH It hasn't. So I think that's at least a learning to take with us forward. And another thing is perhaps how the crisis has hit quite unevenly. We mentioned a bit with you know Brent or crude versus diesel. I think you know you have also other examples. You know, two thirds of cooking all cooking gas, sorry, LPG to India is imported through Hormuz, so a very kind of vulnerable to disruption. So there are quite many examples of more distinct products or distinct routes where you go down to the physical flows, where we see that there's no vessels available to go from A to B, and then really these prices can take off. So, one thing is the global balances and on the big commodities. But when you go into the physical market, into the geographies and the products, you see very large movements. [10:36] NB The idea of an energy trilemma, this trade-off between affordability, security, emissions, well understood. I think most of our listeners are pretty familiar with it. But the way that you looked at how to how the world might look to solve the energy trilemma, or at least begin to address it, I think is really interesting. You know, using a scenario basis, I guess can you kind of lay out the scenarios that you use to think about how the future might evolve and how those kind of reflect this uneasy balance of trying to fix this trilemma or address it if it can be fixed. [11:08] JH Briefly, we have you know three main scenarios in our scenario report that are that are long term. The main scenario are what we call the reference scenario. We call pragmatism. So this is really quite informed, actually, by our expectations in the near term, because we do a lot of, you know, expectations on what we believe for oil markets, gas markets, power markets, etc., as part of our daily work, and that is, you know, coupled with current policies, which also we foresee tightening gradually over time due to some structural trends, but really also affordability and security setting the pace here. I think that's fair to say. So that's our reference scenario. Then we have a climate first scenario, which means much stronger climate policy, more coordinated global action, and you know fast rollout of the clean tech technologies, and really targeting in a more ambitious part, ambitious part of the target from Paris target. And thirdly, we have a fossil-first scenario, which means slower clean tech progression than in pragmatism, weaker climate policies, and a stronger focus on short-term affordability. So they have their kind of different scoring across the trilemma, like you mentioned. But they also have some commonalities. I would say, you know, one thing is important to notice is that all three deliver the same energy and services to the people. So people get the same heating to their houses, mobility, you know, industrial output that is required to deliver on the economic services and growth. So that's the same. But and they also have some other similarities. Actually, even though what is the main difference is really the energy system behind it, and that's what we're cultivating because that's our core is to understand what are the different ways this energy system can deliver on this, you know, human energy services that are needed. But yeah, so and we see that all. What is it? A bit interesting, which I think is a structural change or trend, is that actually fossil fuel demand peaks in all of these scenarios before 2050. It is a very different pathways. But the fact that all of them peak before 2050 is relevant to have in mind. And I think for pragmatists, we see that peak already flattening out in towards 2030 and start falling actually quite early after 2030, whereas in the fossil first, it is still rising and plateauing in the end of you know end 2030s. But actually, by 2050, even the fossil first scenario it has fallen quite significantly from the peak. And the climate first is of course a scenario which is more dramatic change, and you know fossil energy needs decline already from today. This is a trilemma we're talking about. So what does that mean for these other portions? For the security, for the affordability. We've actually worked to quantify several metrics around these dimensions, both on import dependency and cost and investments, etc. And I think the key insight is that no pathway wins on all three dimension, at least not at once. So fossil first is cheapest upfront, but it becomes weaker on security and climate, and actually over time, even on cost, if you really look at the longer lens, because you're a bit stick, you do not take the benefit of some of the lower cost option that comes with some of the such solution technologies. Whereas climate first needs actually massive upfront investments. It's a very tough thing to do from an investment standpoint, you know, massive big grid build out and renewables, and you actually need to retire quite a bit of existing infrastructure before end of life. So pragmatism is a more gradual transition, falls a bit between these that avoids the weakest outcome of let's say any of the dimensions. Actually, so it is a bit more the central pragmatic pathway. [12:00] [15:25] NB One of the key concepts in the report is this idea of an energy toolbox. I mean, it's basically the suite of technologies that the world has to try to address any one part of this. And so, I mean, I guess what I'm wondering is how has that toolbox evolved, and what's been the impact of that evolution on the way that we see the system perhaps progressing, [15:44] JH We had a reference back to the 70s, right? The last crisis, so it's relevant to look a bit back. What was the toolbox back then? And I think if we look at what happened after those crises, you know, part of the response was nuclear power, more efficient cars, less oil in power generation industry and buildings, and also new oil provinces popping up, like in the North Sea. So, a lot of things happened. You think you know, of course, part of a of a technology development that you know was happening in partly any case, but some of this you can definitely take back to the oil crisis. And but the common thing about many of these solutions took years, if not decades, to implement. They were quite slow response mechanisms. And I think since then a lot has happened. We have had technology and innovation for you know 50 years and things happen in that in the meantime. So we expanded, I would say, the energy toolbox quite significantly, and meaning expanded not by you know exotic things, but things that are cost competitive and available at scale. I think both on the fossil side and on the non-fossil side. So shale oil and gas, clear examples, LNG become a global commodity in a way that it wasn't back then. We see how that has, you know, helped Europe, for example, to reduce exposure to pipe gas from Russia, but also solar batteries, heat pumps, EVs. So many of these, what's common with them, that they can actually be deployed in months rather than years, so we have a bigger toolbox, and the additions are actually more responsive than I would say that many of the toolboxes we had before. So that is interesting to have in mind, and I think also going forward, looking what are the structural changes, I think that is also important to have in mind. And just as some examples of that, you know. Solar, probably people have seen this in other occasions, but you know the way solar and wind has grown as power sources is really record high. Nuclear was actually also growing very quickly back in the 80s, but stopped at around 2,000 terawatt hours and has been growing very slowly. After, also with hydro, it took you know 90 years to get to the level solar reached in 13. [16:00] [18:08] NB It seems to me like for the first time, individual consumers actually have options that they can use within that toolbox. They can buy an EV, they can install a rooftop or even balcony solar and a and a battery. They can join a demand side response program. I mean, does this idea that consumers and not just governments can make these choices impact the way that the future might evolve? [18:08] JH You are right. These many of these technologies are more distributed by nature, a smaller scale. Now, back to the modular point, they are small and modular, so consumer can as well pick them up. It's not only for industrial and utilities. So there are definitely more roles for the consumers, at least where the economics works, right? I think there's a quite a famous example that what happened in Pakistan recently: high tariffs, blackouts on the grid there, pushed households and also businesses to install massive amount of rooftop solar in an impressive speed. You know, I think we talk around 14 gigawatts or something in 2025, which is a significant share of their total power capacity in just a year. And I think you can see many other examples if you if you use Google Maps and look at cities, go to Damascus or other. You know, you see solar panels all the way. So consumer now holds option to respond to prices in ways we just talked about, installing equipment like solar panels, and the economics, ironically, can even beat utility-scale solar, so the smaller systems could beat the larger scales, right? Because some of these are placed behind the meters, so they avoid grid costs and taxes for the consumer. So, and I think also we can extend it. You know, we see now also more and more batteries, different service, but also very distributed, low cost. Low cost. It doesn't necessarily need to be big to be cheap. The smaller, the better sometimes, and they can flatten the load for the consumer, reduce their you know grid capacity charges, help them become more secure as well if they appreciate that and take the stress out of the peak hours for the grid makes it a bit more challenging for us as analysts though because we need to get we need to track all the exports of panels and the satellite images to because quite a lot of this is actually falling under the radar of official statistics. [20:00] [20:38] NB One of the things that really struck me about the report is that the direction of travel for the energy system hasn't necessarily changed. I mean, electricity surpassed oil as the largest energy carrier, I believe, last year, and the world continues to electrify. But the reasons the world's electrifying have changed, and so I guess how do we see the global economy electrifying in the years ahead. Is it continuing this pace, and what does that mean, I guess, for overall energy usage and overall energy system? [21:14] JH You know, as we look out to 2050, electrification has actually been a mega trend. If you look back for decades, you know, if you look at oil demand per capita versus electricity demand per capita. They have gone opposite ways for a long time. So it's not new, but it's very right. And I think over time that means that electricity is becoming very important as an energy carrier. And there are different ways to measure it to understand the importance, which can you know all are correct, but they might tell a slightly different importance. If you measure it in final energy, typically the energy all of us buy, both industry and transport and buildings, you buy final energy goods, electricity one of them, oil, gas others. On that level, electricity is around 20%. But if we measure the useful energy you get out of it, actually the amount of heat or the amount of movement, when you take away the losses, and you know, behind the point here is that electricity has generally lower losses than other final energy sources. So when you look at the amount of the share of useful energy, it jumps from 20% to around 35%. So the role, and let's say, if you unplug electricity, you actually lose much more of the services that 20% could indicate. And you can even look at the share of GDP and the importance of you know where the value creation is based on where sectors consume electricity. You get actually closer to 50% of global GDP, so electricity is already an extremely important carrier, and we expect it, or it's growing faster also than the rest. And I think, you know, we it will reach around 50% of useful energy in our pragmatism scenario in 2050. Should be easy to remember, 50 in 2050. So that's the that's the milestone. So, yeah, it is it is really, and I think also it's one observation to you know what this means. I think we also see that this is happening quicker in growing economies, and actually quite a lot of this is this electrification. These states that are electrifying faster is actually many of the states, for example, in China or in Asia, and then many of the countries in Europe or in US, for example, is not necessarily leading the electrification race. To put it that way, [21:14] NB It gets us into this concept of producing and consuming countries for various forms of energy, I mean, one country might be a producer of oil and maybe a consumer of product or something like that. And so, you know, why do you think that the producer consumer dynamic is the right way to analyze this, rather than say by region or geography? You know, here we expect Europe to do this, and the Middle East to do that, and Asia to do that, etc. What does the producer-consumer lens bring to this discussion? [21:14] JH We often talk about you know a country's energy mix and how does the energy system look like their dependency on fuels and electrification and emissions, etc. I think we not forget, but at least sometimes oversee where the energy is actually coming from, you know, the imports, and I think probably that's partly natural also because the energy has been flowing quite undisrupted for a long time. But I think the last few years we remind ourselves about the flow risks, especially with oil and gas. So I think taking the lens, some or importer lens, we also see some quite clear pictures. That is also relevant when we're studying the transition, because I think, for example, the two main importing regions, if you're bundling it is really Asia and Europe that are the big net importers of oil and gas. Of course, there are different countries within those buckets, but it's a very clear picture, you know. The other continents are more either exporters or balanced at gross level or net level. So I think you know, in Asia's net imports has doubled since year 2000, whereas North America, as we know, turned from being a net importer to an exporter. [24:00] [25:19] JH So I think this is important part, and I think some of the good news we see in the scenarios for let's say energy security and import dependence is that fossil fuel import dependence drops also in every of our scenarios, and partly linked, of course, to the what I said about fossil energy. But from today, around 40% of this is primary energy, is imported fossil fuels, and that's dropping to somewhere between 13 to 15% towards 2050, depending on the scenario. So it's a quite significant drop we see, and then of course driven by Asia and Europe, and that is also tells us a bit about who's driving the transition, and we also see that is partly countries that are quite import dependent today. Not saying that it's risk free risk moves, like we call we say in the report from fuels to factories. That's our slogan because we see that yes, there will be reduced import of continuous flows, but you will also be there is quite a bit of concentration, obviously, on the equipment that you are transferring to. [25:19] NB Is this simply a matter of if you have fossil fuels, you burn them, and if you don't, you transition away towards electrification, or is it more nuanced maybe than that? [25:19] JH Perhaps with some nuance. If you have them, I think you want to get the best value from, and that is not always by burning them at home. I think several oil and gas producing countries they are building and ramping up renewables precisely to free up, you know, more oil and gas exports. That makes economic sense, but if you don't have them, I think the benefit of a transition, you know, can go beyond the pure economics. So you might buy security or buy diversification and less exposure to the next fuel shock. So you are right. You know, I think importers have an extra push to transition, and we might call that energy security as part of that push. [27:25] NB This is the time of year when global leaders are gathering in Turkey as we're having this conversation for the latest COP 31 climate talks, and so I guess what I'm wondering here is, you know, what are the implications of these trends that we've highlighted for emissions and for and for warming, ultimately, I mean, can energy pragmatism deliver emissions reduction? [27:47] JH This is, of course, essential to looking at these scenarios. Energy is a very important part of greenhouse gas emissions, obviously. And the story I told on fossil energy development is really the leading indicator for CO2 emissions from the industry. So we see that is plateauing and actually falling over time. And the big question is how quickly is that falling for climate? You know, currently oil, gas, and coal accounts for around 37 gigatons of CO2 right every year, and that means that just you know five six years at that rate increases warming by around 0.1 degree. So it is of great importance to get that down from a climate perspective. I think in our pragmatism scenario, emissions fall around almost 20% 17% I think by 2040, and I think the main reason for or the main reasons for the reductions near term is coal. Some reductions, but mainly and after 2040, we see more and more let's say support emission reduction from oil because we see less demand in road. But of course, it is many nuances into this space here because in oil there are many segments. So even though road is falling, there are other segments that are increasing. So the net effect is not as dramatic. And but in the 2040s we see a more significant reduction and gas as well coming in into the later times. So I think if we sum up the emissions from fossil fuels, there's something like 0.35 degree warming by additional warming from fossil fuels by 2050. So we can put that on top of the 1.3 today. The climate first is approximately 0.1 degree lower, and fossil first approximately 0.1 degree higher. So that shows you a bit of the sensitivity when it comes to warming [28:00] [29:44] NB One thing I'm wondering is does climate ever come back kind of as a main driver of energy policy we've talked about the rise of pragmatism and affordability and security concerns could I guess climate again be a main driver and what might that look like? [29:58] JH There have been some, you know, cycles historically. You know, in the early 2000s, climate science rose on the agenda, but I think impacts felt more distant than perhaps cutting emissions was more expensive. So I think we saw limited action for quite some time. And after Paris, science was much stronger. Solar and wind costs have fallen sharply. Even shale prices were low, so I think security and affordability was less pressing, and it was easier to focus on sustainability. So I think we came from that, let's say, cycle. And the last couple of years, of course, security and affordability is the top of mind, and sustainability takes a bit of a backseat. But if it will come back, I think so. I think so. But I think in a in a different shape. I think, and I think all of those has been different before as well. They have evolved. So I think consequences of climate change will become more visible, and the cost of cutting emissions will likely to continue to fall, and I also see some synergies between energy security and sustainability, especially for importers, as we as we discussed. So, by focusing on energy efficiency and domestic renewables, so I think. But I think it will be a bit more pragmatic sustainability. Again, learn from or learning from history, perhaps I'm a bit optimistic there, but I think we will. But I think abatement cost will perhaps matter even more, where the high cost options, you know, they take budget and resources away from the cheaper one. We do need research and development on promising new solutions, but they need a line of sight onto a reasonable cost, you know, to attract big capital, right? And I also think that co-benefits there will there is now more focus on co-benefits, so that you know you look at the measures that also deliver whether it's on nature or energy security or local jobs and value creation. So I think sustainability will be seen more and more also together with other benefits. [32:00] [32:05] NB That does lead me to where I think a lot of people where they feel energy impacts most in their life, which is simply price. You know, I think the question on everyone's mind is: Is energy going to get cheaper or is it going to get more expensive in the future? Do we have a view on that. [32:21] JH Yeah, it's the key question, right? It's no easy answer to it, actually. To be honest, it depends very much on where you are, what you need energy for, and when you need it, actually as well. So, but I think part of today's high prices is cyclical, right? So we're in sentiment now with very high oil and gas prices, high interest rates. You know, and over the long run, I think the picture is more positive than today. We have new technologies like solar batteries and EVs that is getting cheaper, and innovation will continue. Press will get cheaper nuclear, like we discussed, or cheaper new battery technologies for fossil energy. The long-term projections, you know, perhaps a bit more stable. Not they're not deflationary by nature as some of these other technologies. So they're actually, as you alluded to, actually lower demand might help lower prices, right, of these finite resources really in the in the real long term. But in the near term, I think we are actually in a rather good situation. What I think people will see or will experience is that location will matter more than before. Just as an example, you know, if you're if you are a place where your demand matches the sun profile, like air conditioning in a warm region, you can access probably the cheapest electrons in history. But in Oslo, where I sit, where the sun is now starting to go down already on a Friday afternoon, where solar panels deliver, you know, only a 10th in January of what they do in July. In January is where I want to hit my home, right? So Norway gets less from the solar revolution, to put it that way. But most people live closer to equator than I do. More than 80% of the world's population live where this is a bit technical. The worst solar month delivers more than half of the best. So I said that Oslo we get 10% ish in the worst month, but 80% live in regions where they actually get more than 50%. Many of them much closer to 50% of the top month, meaning that the seasonal variations are not that big, and that's good news for energy cost for those people. So many people are located in locations that can benefit that from this to a large extent. Also, of course, location for wind, as we as with fossil fuels, people have benefited for location as well, but I think also demand. So location is one thing, but also your demand. I think a fuel-based system, to a large extent, is able to adjust reduction to demand. So we're a bit spoiled, you know. We just consume and we yes, prices vary a bit during the day, but perhaps not as much as we see now with weather-based systems, where they produce energy when the wind blows and the sun generates, so if you're able to adjust to that, you can get very cheap prices. And if not, you need to pay for the additional services to get it firmed out, whether it's batteries or some extra plants to flex, etc. And I think the final element to just conclude on it is, of course, we talked a lot about you know producing energy. I think a key differentiator is also to get energy to the end user. If you're an existing city that is you know depending on gas for heating, there's quite a lot of infrastructure to get the energy to the consumer. [36:00] [36:00] JH So all of this, you know, I think it's no easy answer. I think many people will enjoy cheaper energy, certainly not all, and there will be a combination. The good thing is that energy as a part of global GDP is falling over time. So we're spending at least less and less of our available, you know, spending on energy. [36:00] NB Jo, thanks for giving us this glimpse into the energy system. It's been great to have you on the show. [36:00] JH Thank you. Thank you, Noah. Pleasure to be here. [36:00] NB Let's recap. We're in the midst of the greatest energy supply shock in history, but a larger toolbox of options has helped keep some, but not all, prices below their record highs. The world will continue to electrify, even if the drivers of electrification may change, from worries about climate to worries about energy security and affordability. And looking ahead, some forms of energy will get cheaper, and some could end up being more expensive. And much of that depends on whether countries are producing it themselves or importing it from abroad. Thanks for listening to Let's Talk Energy. This podcast is a Rystad Energy production, and this episode is produced by Rystad Energy and Bada Ogle. Check out the show notes for further analysis on the topics we've discussed in the episode, and find us on social media. We're at Rystad Energy on all your major platforms. While you're there, leave us a review, hit that like button, and subscribe. You can also keep up to date on our website. If you'd like to send us questions or reflect on today's episode, or maybe you've got an idea for our next one, email us directly. It's podcast@rystadenergy.com. And finally, most importantly, don't forget to keep an eye on your feed for our very next edition of Let's Talk Energy.
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