Venezuela’s oil and gas recovery: How far can it go? With Radhika Bansal and Rob Cordray

Let's Talk Energy — Episode 49 TBC Wednesday, 21 October 2026 SPEAKERS NB Noah Brenner — Host RB Radhika Bansal — Senior Vice President, South American Oil and Gas Research, Rystad Energy RC Rob Cordray — Managing Director, Americas, Rystad Energy NOTE: A few turns in the source file were unlabeled ("Unknown") or misattributed between the two guests; speaker attribution for those turns has been reconstructed from context. Please verify against the original recording before publishing. [00:00] [00:22] NB This is Let's Talk Energy, your go-to podcast for smart energy insights. I'm Noah Brenner. Venezuela has the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the world and was once a top global producer, but years of mismanagement have left the country's oil and gas industry in disarray. However, renewed international interest in the wake of geopolitical and regulatory changes has many wondering if Venezuela could again make good on its lofty production potential. So, how much oil could Venezuela realistically produce in the next few years, and what will it take to get there? Which companies are already well positioned, and who could be eyeing an opportunity to get in, and finally, what signal should we be watching in the next few months and years that will tell us the trajectory of any potential upstream recovery? To answer these questions and assess the medium-term prospects for oil and gas production in Venezuela, I'm joined today from Oslo by Radhika Bansal, a senior vice president focusing on South American oil and gas research. Radhika, welcome back. [00:22] RB Thank you so much, Noah. It's a pleasure to be back. [00:22] NB And from Houston, I have Rob Cordray, Rystad Energy's managing director in the Americas. Rob, welcome to the program. [01:33] RC Thanks. Great to be here. [01:35] NB Well, let's talk energy. Why are we talking about Venezuela again in the first place. I mean, I think Radhika, let's let's start with you. What has actually changed in the outlook here? [01:47] RB It's a perfect time for us to be discussing Venezuela. It's back in the limelight, and the biggest change in Venezuela has been the breadth of participation. So we are seeing established operators expanding, new entrants coming in, and service companies re-engaging in ways that we have not seen happen in the country over the last several years. And more importantly, I think the critical element here is that we are seeing agreements translate into actual physical activity on the ground. So, for example, SLB is kind of working towards reactivating rigs in the country. We have Nabors, which is you know has contracted a rig for a 2027 restart, and a lot of additional rig components are being mobilized from the U.S. Also, NABEP, which is the North American Blue Energy Partners recently also announced that they've brought in two new rigs and are deploying 11 new workover rigs while like continuing to expand on their fleet equipment and that is kind of aligned with you know what we've been hearing on ground from you know various operators and industry connects, but the discussion is really moving towards actual work programs, equipments, services, and how quickly can activity really scale up. And so I just feel like the recovery in Venezuela seems much more tangible now. And then the next test for the country is just going to be, you know, how quickly is this activity able to translate itself in terms of sustainable and reliable production moving forward? It [03:30] NB certainly has been a long time since we've heard the word new rig and Venezuela in the same sentence, and so I want to ask you, Rob. I mean, does this feel like a real reopening? I mean, there have kind of been hiccups in the past, or optimism in the past, maybe, but commercially, you know, does this does this feel like it's got legs? [03:46] RC I would call it a reopening, but I'd put an important qualifier around that. It's not yet a fully normalized investment environment. It's asset by asset sort of reopening, and the reason it feels different, I think, a bit like Radhika mentioned, is companies move beyond simply maintaining relationships or having a seat at the table. They're negotiating operating control, specific cost recovery mechanisms, marketing rights, defined investment programs, and those are things that really allow capital to move. But they're also being very selective. You know, a field with existing production, clear infrastructural bottleneck, and a two or three-year payback is quite different from a multi-billion-dollar greenfield development that requires confidence in a fiscal and legal framework for the next 20 or 30 years. So yes, I think it's real. It'll be reopened and focused on lending sort of ordinary things: purchase orders, workover contracts, compressors, rigs, contractors actually being paid. So I would summarize it by saying announcements create optionality, but it's execution that creates production. [04:00] [04:45] NB Within that context, what are you watching? What should we be watching, our listeners, beyond kind of the political announcements and the things like that? I mean, what matters for the industry? [04:56] RC I think I would watch behavior rather than announcements. You know, who's controlling the work program, who's approving procurement, contractors being paid, rigs and workover crews mobilizing, are the early barrels of production stable enough to be exported and monetized? So I would watch more sort of what happens and the activity more than just sort of the announcements and the and the press releases. [05:18] NB Radhika, I wanted to come back to you quickly. You mentioned some of the service companies that are obviously becoming more active, but I mean, how are you seeing some of the optimism that Rob's been talking about actually reflected in the ambitions of the operators themselves? [05:31] RB We are seeing a lot of these established operators expanding, and on the other side of the spectrum, we are seeing new entrants coming in. So, like, if you talk about the established operators, like for example, Chevron is about to commit $7 billion of investments over the next five years and plans to ramp up production to 600,000 barrels per day, which is more than double of what it currently is producing. And then it's also like expanding, you know, its portfolio in the nearby Carabobo area. Then, on the other hand, we have Repsol, which is like talking about you know increasing Venezuela production by 50% in one year, and maybe tripling that over the next three years if you know conditions remain the same. When we talk about others like ENI, it's taking operatorship of you know this project in the Orinoco, which is Junín 5, and then Shell is also re-entering you know with Curipo and Piritalfield. Now on the other end, we have these new entrants like Geo Park, Hunt Oil, Fluxus, as well as Nabep, which is you know, which recently signed a contract for the 17 development projects in the country. So obviously the you know the ambition is quite big and the operator scope is much broader. But I would say like you know in the near term we at Rystad favor investments which or commitments that are coming from more established operators or defined assets, rather than you know large scale projects which would require external capital. [07:12] NB How much oil can Venezuela realistically produce? You know, let's say by 2030. Let's keep a very near term near term outlook here. But before we talk about that growth, I guess Radhika, can you just kind of ground the conversation? I mean, what's Venezuela producing now, maybe, and what have we actually seen the trend be say from the beginning of the year? [07:32] RB We can start by saying that Venezuela is currently producing slightly more than 1.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, and the trend for 2026 has broadly been trending upwards, but I think what's more important to understand is like where has this ramp up really come from, and it's it's mostly been a very brownfield led story, and by brownfield we mean like basically production coming in from you know existing producing assets, so it's it's very much something which you know like Rob also mentioned previously. Like it's it's something which is coming from existing fields just through you know reactivation of wells, de bottlenecking, workovers, artificial lift, etc. So it's it's very much been a very brownfield led recovery, but over the longer time, over the longer term, what would become critical is building out the greenfield or developments in the Orinoco Belt, primarily, which is where the large resource base is sitting, and that is when Venezuela can really expand on its production capacity beyond what we see in the New York Dome. [08:00] [08:42] NB Rob, where do those first incremental barrels come from? I mean, Radhika said it's a brownfield led story, but I mean, where is this jump, at least initially, going to happen? [08:53] RC Frankly, the first barrels come from fixing what is already there. I mean, I think we tend, you know, in a global upstream analysis world, to jump immediately to rigs and new wells, but the real production response is what Radhika is talking about. It's more likely from workovers, pump replacements, gas lift, flow line repairs, compression, stabilizing power, and those sort of things. In the heavy roll areas, I mean, its diluent and blending capacity are just as important as the reservoir. The conventional again, modest investment in lift, fluid handling, gathering infrastructure will unlock production a whole lot faster than any sort of brand new greenfield. So I would actually call the first phase an industrial maintenance and rehabilitation campaign. The fastest barrel will probably come from these infrastructure or parallel sort of things, much more so than going out and drilling brand new wells. [09:40] NB We're talking about in Venezuela, a lot of the oil is very heavy, and it's got to be mixed with a lighter oil in order to get it to flow and to get it into to an export grade. and we're going to talk more about that in just a second. But I mean, Radhika, there's some low-hanging fruit, obviously, that Rob has highlighted. But where does that next step up? I mean, there's there's got to be a limit to the low-hanging fruit. So where does the that next incremental barrel come from, and it's I'm I'm guessing it's probably not as easy as simply fixing things. [10:07] RB The first barrels are relatively easier to get, like you said, it's a low hanging fruit, and those can mostly, like I said, they come from like existing wells and infrastructure which is already in place. You know, through all of the ways, like we mentioned, reactivation of wells, debottlenecking, repairing of pipelines, etc. The next barrels are relatively harder to come by because then we start looking at you know sanctioning these large greenfield projects, which are not yet producing and which, like I said, basically sit in this extra heavy oil or Orinoco belt. But the risk profile that those kind of sanctioning of those kind of projects requires is very different because this is like multi-billion dollar kind of projects that we are looking at with long payout periods. So the kind of confidence that an operator would need to like make those kind of commitments is going to be very different from you know what we've seen happen with the brownfield recovery. So when it comes to making those commitments, I think you know operators would basically be looking at stability when it comes to fiscal terms or like payment mechanisms, having proper access to diluents, reliable power, export growths. So all of that needs to really come together for somebody to you know make those kind of large capital investments, so it's like you know it becomes harder as you progressively move towards you know from restoring production to like really building out new capacity within the country. [11:35] NB If we're looking at Venezuela's say ability to hit 1.5 million barrels per day, is that is that a conservative way to think about the potential here, or is that an ambitious one? And maybe Radhika, let's start with you. But I'd like to hear you from you as well, Rob. [11:51] RC According to me, I feel like 1.5 million barrels per day of crude oil production for Venezuela is achievable, but it's it's not automatic. Like maybe Venezuela does not need to recreate the industry that it had back during its historic peak, but we do need to start seeing some sustained improvement in brownfield performance, more reliable infrastructure being in place, export routes being in place. So a lot needs to happen, you know, for that growth story to materialize. [12:00] [12:23] NB And Rob, over what time frame is 1.5 million barrels per day perhaps logical? And is there a scenario where we get more? [12:30] RC You could get to 1.5 in the next couple of years, or maybe about 2030. Because I think, you know, as Radhika mentioned, you know, conservative does not mean automatic. The country still needs to mobilize capital, equipment, people at a pace that it hasn't demonstrated for years, or frankly, decades, and the resources there, right? So let's say 1.5 million is a reasonable floor for a functioning recovery, and maybe 1.8 is a successful execution case. But beyond that, any sort of rapid move back towards historical levels would require a much more profound reconstruction of the entire industry, frankly. [13:03] NB You've kind of got three major opportunities there in Venezuela: the Faja or the Orinoco Belt, as Radhika has referred to in the past earlier in the conversation. We've got Lake Maracaibo, another major historical production center, and then the conventional fields in eastern Venezuela. Let's start with the Faja. Radhika, maybe you could describe just a little bit how it differs from, say, a conventional oil field. We've mentioned these diluents, and how much of our long-term outlook depends on success there. [13:32] RB The Faja, or like the Orinoco Belt, is one of the world's largest accumulation of extra-heavy oil. So resource is definitely not an issue, you know, when we talk about Faja. But it is very different from a conventional oil field. When we talk about this Faja or the Orinoco, the crude oil that we're talking about here is extremely heavy. So it's not just like producing a barrel there is just part of the story. We need access to diluents, reliable power, gathering and processing systems, storage, export routes. So there is some near-term brownfield potential within Faja from the existing producing projects within that area. But if Venezuela has to move materially beyond, you know, what we are thinking about in the near term through this decade, then it has to start thinking about sanctioning more developments within the Faja, and that is why Faja becomes extremely central to this long-term growth story because that is where the scale sits. [14:38] NB Rob, these are not cheap investments, and so what do you think it's going to take for companies to start to greenlight and take FID on some of these more material, you know, beyond the brownfield? I guess maybe in the Faja. This [14:51] RC is not just drill a well and out comes the oil. It's a complete system of diluent return, separation, moving all these sort of things around. So, in a brownfield recovery situation, I think the existing areas will be places where companies will focus and will invest, etc. But you know, anything longer term, you're going to need you know operational controls important, procurement, maintenance centers, contractors, all of that stuff. And you know, it's not as much you know how much you own of it, but is there a system where you can go through, make these multi-year investments and have multi-year returns. Right. So again, as we've mentioned before, the existing facilities, brownfield is for us now. Larger new developments, you're going to need a lot more confidence in long-term contract stability and everything that implies. [15:38] NB I wanted to talk about Lake Maracaibo. I mean, this is obviously a massive kind of existing set of assets, set of fields. I guess can Lake Maracaibo become kind of a short cycle lever, a place where investment can maybe happen more quickly, or is there simply too much deterioration? I mean, is the infrastructure just too kind of decrepit to support that type of maybe shorter cycle investment. [16:00] [16:05] RB I think it's very different from the extra heavy oil that we spoke about, which is part of the Faja or the Orinoco belt. I feel like Lake Maracaibo definitely has the potential to you know add meaningful barrels relatively quickly because there is already a lot in place in terms of like there are wells in place, there are facilities in place. But like you rightly mentioned, Noah, it's like a lot of the infrastructure there is extremely old, and so it is not enough to just fix the well. One requires like power, compression, pipelines, water handling, and all of that needs to come together for the system to work. So this is probably not going to be a basin-wide restart, but something where you know identification of certain clusters need to be made, wherein the whole system can be brought back reliably for this to work. [16:57] NB Rob, anything to add on Maracaibo? Otherwise, I want to ask you about some of these conventional fields in the eastern part of Venezuela. [17:04] RC The tendency is to sort of overlook not only Maracaibo, but also the conventional fields in the east and Oriente. But I think it's because they don't really have the headline scale of Faja. But if the question is where you can put money to work, demonstrate a production response, and recover that investment relatively quickly, these fields I think are very important. Subsurface is known. Crude's easier to market. Field doesn't require the diluent and upgrading systems as we have in heavy oil. Makes them, I mean, obviously very well suited to workovers, artificial lift-ish, compression, infill drilling, etc. And allows you also to sort of test these new commercial structures on a manageable scale. Right, put money in, get money back out in a reasonable time frame is much less risky than doing some large greenfield, as we mentioned before. I would also be a little careful about calling maybe Eastern Venezuela easy. Some of these fields are deep, high pressure, technically demanding, but really as a portfolio, these fields can provide probably some of the fastest barrels and the clearest evidence, not only internally but externally, that the reopening model was working. [18:05] NB We've talked about putting capital into the country. We've talked about the need to revamp all of these systems that oftentimes we don't pay a lot of attention to because in other producing areas they're already in place. And so, I mean, I guess Rob, let's put your capital allocator hat on here. If you've got $10 billion to put into Venezuela, I guess where would you put the first dollar yourself? And then the next part of that question is: Is that actually where we're seeing the money going necessarily in what we've seen today? [18:32] RC And I think my first dollar would go to the bottleneck that's preventing the largest amount of existing production to reach the market. You know, think of a bit of a tornado diagram. What is the one thing holding back production? And but that's not the same everywhere. It might be a compressor in one place, might be power gathering or a separator in some other place. So I think the point is I would not begin with a national drilling target. You need to go field by field and perhaps even well by well in terms of the constraints. So if I had 10 billion, a large share go into power, compression, gas lift, gathering systems, fluid handling, etc. Also fund a substantial workover program, an artificial lift in the lake as well, because I think there's existing wells that can respond without waiting for a full drilling campaign. It's also a way to put some capital in, get some money back out, and I think capital is starting to move in that direction because I think operators favor that faster production response. But you also have coordination because individual companies can come in and repair their own wells. But there's some regional infrastructure that would serve several fields or operators. And if those systems lag behind, the field level investment won't get the returns you need, or at least in a timely fashion. So I'll finish this by saying I think the most valuable dollar in Venezuela might be a very boring dollar. These are not 20k BOPs and things. It's a transformer. It's simple stuff. But this blocking and tackling is what makes the upstream business work around the globe, and I think it's really a great way for us to work our way in as an industry and begin the recovery of Venezuela. Radhika, would you agree? I mean, drilling-that you know-it sounds maybe counterintuitive for somebody following the upstream industry that is not actually drilling that we should be paying attention to. Would you agree that drilling maybe isn't the priority, and it's other parts of the services sector that we need to be more dialed in on? [20:00] [20:16] RB I think I agree with Rob here. I think he is going to put his money in the right place when he talks about the allocation there, but I agree. You know, in terms of like, I don't think drilling is necessarily the first priority everywhere. Like, there are a lot of fields wherein there are existing wells which can, you know, just be you can just make them work better, and that just means like fixing pumps, like all of the things that Rob just mentioned, restoring power and compression, repairing pipelines, doing workovers before one really starts to think about starting an altogether new drilling campaign. So I think the first benefits of this benefit is going to go to the service companies who can really help operators, you know, restore production from these existing wells that are already there. And I think once that system is working reliably, and that potential has been maximized, then one can think of, you know, moving towards drilling new campaigns altogether. [21:20] NB It kind of goes back to that old story about the U.S. gold rush, where you know the people that initially got rich were the ones selling the shovels to the gold miners, not necessarily the ones who were who were going out to do the prospecting. I want to shift gears a little bit here because the conversation to date has been very oil focused, and oftentimes we think of Venezuela through very a very oil centric lens. Let's talk about natural gas. Some of the initial deals, some of the initial investments that have been announced, have really been focused around natural gas. Venezuela's got you know I won't say as much gas as oil, but I mean it's got huge gas reserves, and yet the country is still constrained when it comes to actually having the gas that it needs, much less gas to export, and so Rob, maybe you can help us sort of reconcile that dichotomy of massive gas reserves and honestly a country that is starved for gas. [22:12] RC We often talk globally about stranded gas, but you don't hear people talk very much about stranded oil, right? And the reason is that a gas resource is not the same thing as usable gas at the point where it's needed. So Venezuela again, enormous gas resources. A lot of that's associated or located offshore or separated from demand from gathering, processing, transmission system issues or their non-existence. So you have gas flared or stranded in one location, while an oil field somewhere else lacks that exact gas for either for power compression or gas lift. It's also creating across sort of the economy. I think Venezuela traditionally has not done a lot on developing its domestic gas industry, but it's needed for power industry, petrochemicals, rejection, all those sort of things. The offshore gas may have export value. I think we'll talk about that a little bit more later on, but domestic gas is really going to be sold into a market that historically struggled to support these sort of full cycle investments, other than it's used for oil production. So to finish, the constraint's not molecules in the ground; it's gas at the right pressure, right location under a commercial structure that actually pays for that infrastructure that's needed. [23:20] NB Well, I want to talk about one of the important, I guess, domestically aimed sort of gas resources, which is the fields known as Perla, the Perla project. Radhika, you know, what role I guess could Perla play in terms of starting to address some of that shortage? [23:38] RB Perla is extremely important, you know, in terms of gas for Venezuela because it's just such a large source of non-associated gas, which is already producing at scale. So Perla is currently producing around 580 million cubic feet per day of gas, and that's already like one of the largest gas assets for the country in the near term, like Rob mentioned, the gas being developed is primarily supporting domestic power industry and the gas balances. But I think over time, Perla has the potential of you know being that platform where offshore gas can be scaled and potentially creating options you know for export. As of now, I think when we talk about Perla, it is like a good anchor for domestic supply, and as a proof that you know large offshore gas can be commercially produced by international operators like ENI and Repsol. [24:00] [24:37] NB Rob, does a successful you know kind of ramp up at Perla. Does that enable oil production? I mean, you mentioned all of the gas and power needs that a operating oil field has. You know, does gas enable kind of an upside oil case? [24:54] RC I think it certainly could, especially in the lake where gas lift is so important, right? And also, gas for power generation, electricity, etc. etc. So I certainly think it could, and it's kind of in the right place geographically, right? It's just a question of the economic model for that. Obviously, it's easier if you're producing that gas to go into your own oil fields. That could make it make it better. But again, I think it is very selective. So it's not taking a bunch of gas from Perla and putting it into a bunch of oil wells in Maracaibo. It's understanding the reservoirs, where the near-term upside is. There's a lot of work that needs to happen before the work actually starts. But certainly, it could be it could be great. [25:31] NB You've both mentioned the opportunity for gas export, and I know many of the companies that are working there certainly and have access to gas reserves are certainly thinking about: Is there a way to get this gas into a global market that, quite frankly, right now is short, given the disruptions we've seen in the Strait of Hormuz? It seems like the most logical route isn't actually through Venezuela, but through Trinidad and Tobago. And so let's talk a little bit about Trinidad and Tobago's situation and the connection to Venezuela, and how that's going to potentially influence gas for exports. So, Radhika, why is Trinidad the logical route? I guess, and what kind of project should we be looking at in terms of understanding how that might develop? [26:16] RB Trinidad is extremely logical, you know, for Venezuela because much of the down downstream system which Venezuela would have to build already sits in Trinidad. So when you talk about like gas processing, LNG trains, you know, gas petrochemicals, or for example, storage, experienced operators, or just access to LNG markets, it already sits in Trinidad, but the problem for Trinidad has been feed gas availability, and Venezuela, on the other hand, has this large offshore gas resources which sits very close to that infrastructure, so it's it's a very natural commercial fit, I would say, for both of these countries. I would think of those projects, you know, in different stages. So I feel like Dragon has been one of the projects which has served as a proof of concept for the country. Manakin-Coquina adds another source of gas supply, and then we have Loran, which is where you know the massive scale really sits. So I think if Loran is you know if Venezuela is able to develop Loran in a in a massive way, then I think Venezuela can really move from being this optionality, which Trinidad currently has to backfill gas and move towards being a very structural and integral part of Trinidad's gas story. [27:45] NB Radhika, as you mentioned, Trinidad gas short, Venezuela gas long. The implications for Trinidad, particularly the Atlantic LNG facility, which has traditionally, well, over the last probably number of years, been running below capacity because it didn't have enough feed gas, and so I mean, Rob, how do we see this dynamic potentially changing that situation for Atlantic LNG and what it could bring to the global market? [28:00] [28:12] RC Well, I mean, I think the Venezuelan gas could be very valuable actually to both sides of the border there because it's more than just adding a source of supply. You're really thinking like we see in infrastructure-led exploration in the deep water around the world, these tiebacks sort of economics are great because you're not sinking all the money into building a brand new facility from scratch. But the real question is, you know, is this gas going to arrive reliably? You know, what's the predictability of this cross-border supply, like being interrupted by licensing changes, payment disputes, or political decisions, you can't really value that as much as fully secure domestic gas. So, the opportunity is extremely compelling, but it needs to be converted into a bankable supply chain, durable rights, clear pricing, dependable volumes, and a credible remedy if one party doesn't perform. [29:00] NB There's obviously a reason that this hasn't; these two countries haven't collaborated in this manner previously. And so, I mean, I guess Rob, staying with you here, I mean, kind of what needs to happen commercially, you know, from a contractual standpoint as well, to unlock this what looks to be a very logical plan of development here. [29:18] RC You're exactly right. I mean, the resource and infrastructure fits pretty straightforward. It's the commercial chains, the difficult part, and the project needs durable authorization. You know, you can't do a multi-billion-dollar cross-border development without with permissions that might expire or change. You know, before the capital is recovered. And secondly, the gas sales agreement has to define price, volume, quality, pressure, delivery obligations, all the standard stuff. And then the payment structure needs to isolate project cash flow and give investors the confidence that revenue can be collected. Right? Cross-border questions, of course, won't go through the entire list, but title transfer, who meters, which law, taxes, tariffs, all those sort of things. And then you have to synchronize. Right? Ideally, you've got similar companies or players on each side, but infrastructure operations must be synchronized. Field pipeline, everything must be ready at the same time. Now, I'll finish this answer to your question, though. But none of these issues on their own are individually unusual. What makes this challenging is that they all sit across multiple companies, two countries, and an external sanctions and licensing framework. So, not straightforward, but it makes a lot of sense in many ways, and that's something that I think everyone will try to make happen. [30:26] NB We keep coming back to this idea of commercial frameworks, investability, certainty, regulatory certainty, and so I guess Radhika, let's let's dive into that. With I mean, what protections do you see investors needing in order to make these some of the numbers you threw a $7 billion investment or something like that? What needs to be in place to enable that? [30:50] RB I can maybe categorize it into three broad points. So I guess like operational control, stability of fiscal and commercial terms, and then confidence, you know, in being able to monetize the production and cash genuinely being, you know, collected. So a company, you know, may tolerate some kind of uncertainty over short cycle brownfield workover projects, but then, you know it's like when you're when you're looking at something where the capital at risk is relatively large, like when we talk about these multi-billion-dollar kind of investments which would be needed to you know further sanction and develop these projects in the Orinoco Belt. Then it's like a altogether different kind of confidence that one needs to put in that kind of money in you know getting those projects up and running. So it's like all of the things that Rob also mentioned. Like there has to be clarity around fiscal terms. There has to be payment mechanisms in place. There have to be like proper infrastructure in place, and then surety that you know the agreements that one is getting into are there for the long haul. So yeah, I think all of that is really important, and I think a useful example from one of the operators recently around that topic has been Repsol. You know, which in its April agreement explicitly emphasized on you know both regaining operatorship of the Petroquiriquire project and also establishing like the payment mechanism, which you know kind of shows how important these commercial you know protections are in practice for these operators. [32:00] [32:37] NB It's interesting, I guess maybe one underappreciated aspect of this brownfield development is as a proof of concept and as a confidence builder, allowing the industry to maybe walk before it starts to run. But Rob, I want to come back to something you said earlier in the in the episode, which was around operational control, perhaps being more important than the ownership percentage, which I have to say is a little hard for me to wrap my head around. You know, I normally would want to own more of something, and that would be the main thing I'm I'm most interested in. So, why do you think operatorship is what these companies maybe are going to be more focused on? [33:10] RC Well, I think it's a it's more than just being the named operator. I think it's having meaningful operational commercial control, and I probably would prefer that with a smaller ownership percentage than larger economic interests without much control at all. I need to control the budget, contractors, maintenance measure. You know that all that is super important. So technical operatorship is not enough. It's about really being able to control and cash conversion is really what turns an attractive resource into a fundable project. [33:40] NB I want to talk about this issue of payment. Companies have had problems getting paid in Venezuela in the past. We've seen you've mentioned Repsol, you've mentioned Chevron. These are companies that have run balances essentially where they were not able to necessarily be paid all the time. And so, you know, how are for either of you? I guess how should companies be thinking about a credible way to make sure that if they are investing money, that money not only has a nominal return or a paper return, but it puts cash in their pocket or at least cash they can spend within country. [34:14] RC I can start and certainly have Radhika jump in. The most credible payment mechanisms want this time directly to production and export revenue, right? Buyers in a ring fenced account. Production is independently measured. Cash falls in agreed waterfall. Operators and contractors are paid for, or the operating cost and contractors are made paid first. Capital is recovered. Remaining value then of course the state and project partners. I mean, this is pretty standard stuff, you know, around the world. Payment in kind can work too in oil, but you need to have clear lifting and marketing rights. I think what companies will avoid is building a large unsecured receivable against the balance sheet of the state or PDVSA. I will finish by saying arbitration is a backstop. It's not a payment mechanism. If you have to go to arbitration, it's sort of too late. This needs to be established up front. [34:59] RB I completely agree. Like ring-fenced cash flows, and just ensuring, like I said, you know, getting money out of the production and every barrel that is that the operator is producing, and ensuring that you know it's not receivables at the end of the day, but they're really able to you know get the money out of those producing barrels. [35:19] NB One thing that I'm seeing from this conversation is obviously interest from the majors and these bigger companies is driving headlines. But having kind of a full ecosystem, whether it's some of these smaller companies, some larger companies, as well, is going to be important for activity and having companies that are able to tackle some of these different types of opportunities. And I guess in the year ahead, I'll be watching some of whether some of these smaller players and this kind of more diverse set of operators is actually able to navigate a pretty complicated commercial landscape and get to work. Rob, the [35:52] RC opportunity here is real. The resources are obviously exceptional, and meaningful recovery is achievable, right? But the paces will be determined by infrastructure operating authority, which we just discussed, service capacity, and the ability to turn this production into protected reinvestible cash flow. Again, it's pretty straightforward to talk about, but it's a lot more complicated to actually implement. So for me, it's about do we see cash raised, cash earned by investments in this country, and then if we see those reinvested back into Venezuela, that's a sign that this has got some sustainability to it for sure. [36:00] [36:27] NB Radhika, the [36:28] RB main takeaway for me when it comes to Venezuela would be that Venezuela's recovery is much more credible now than it has been in the last several years. Like I said, the operator base is broader. The commercial environment is better, and we are increasingly seeing activity on the ground. But I think through this decade, like you know, we mentioned before, the ramp up or the activity is mostly going to be a brownfield led story. And like Rob mentioned, I think we do need to see you know capital getting reinvested and a lot of the structure being in place. So I feel like the turning point for Venezuela moving forward will not just be another production milestone that we talk about, but it'll be like the first major new Orinoco development which will be sanctioned under the new commercial structure, because then that would basically show that the country has moved from this, you know, brownfield recovery phase to actually reinvesting or investing this long-term capital in the country. [37:34] NB Well, thank you both for joining me. It's really been a fascinating conversation. [37:37] RB Thank you so much, Noah. [37:39] RC Thank you, Noah. [37:40] NB Thanks for listening to Let's Talk Energy. 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