The figure above shows the latest assessment from our Article 6 readiness indicator. Only four countries – just 2% of those evaluated – can be considered operational Article 6 supply countries, meaning they are able to issue and transfer carbon credits in line with the rules. These countries have the core architecture required for credible cooperation: a functioning designated national authority (DNA) – the government body that approves and oversees a country’s Article 6 activities – as well as defined participation rules, an authorization process that works in practice, and a registry capable of supporting initial reports. These components enable countries to approve, issue, track, and account for mitigation outcomes in a manner that avoids inconsistencies and double-counting.

Below this small top tier sits a group of 39 emerging-readiness countries (about 15%). Many countries, including Cambodia, Ghana, Rwanda, Peru, and Thailand, have DNAs in place, early participation requirements defined, and are beginning to pilot cooperative approaches through letters of authorization. Their systems, however, are still incomplete. Authorization decisions often outpace registry development; monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) frameworks are still being formalized; and reporting remains partial. These countries are advancing, but their readiness remains project-deep and system-shallow.

The figure above illustrates the growth of bilateral agreements (BA) over time, categorized by host continent. Many countries have now signed at least one BA, signaling broad political interest, yet most remain far from operational readiness. The issue is not the number of agreements, but the fact that cooperation is moving faster than system development. Countries are signing BAs without yet having the necessary processes in place to authorize, track, and account for mitigation outcomes under Article 6.

This dynamic is already shaping how cooperation and finance flow. Credit-buying countries with explicit Article 6 strategies – Norway being the clearest example – are reserving budget not only for mitigation outcomes but for targeted capacity-building in partner countries. Buyers increasingly look for concrete signals, such as established DNAs, participation rules, authorization procedures, and at least the foundations of a registry. Where these elements exist, cooperation accelerates; where they do not, partnerships struggle to take shape.

Demand signals reinforce the urgency of scaling the supply of carbon credits. Under the EU’s 2040 climate framework, which sets a 90% emissions reduction target, up to 5% of 1990-level emissions may be met through internationally transferred mitigation outcomes. The text leaves open whether this flexibility applies only to compliance in 2040 or whether carbon-credit purchasing can begin from the mid-2030s, and it does not specify whether the 5% limit is a one-time budget, a multi-year allowance or an annual cap. The proposal also kept open the discussion of allowing up to 10% use, although the political agreement refers to 5%.

This uncertainty affects expected demand volumes, and it also means that the near-term demand signal from the EU is limited. Any meaningful pull on supply before 2035 is more likely to come from country NDCs rather than the EU target. The EU framework is better understood as a longer-term anchor for future demand. With only four operationally ready countries and 39 in the emerging tier, the current pipeline remains insufficient.

Early experience with Article 6.2 technical reviews points to the same conclusion. Every initial report reviewed so far has been flagged for inconsistencies, indicating that systems are still maturing. The review process simply reveals the administrative gaps already visible in the data.

Taken together, the picture after COP 30 is unambiguous. The rulebook is stable. International demand, from early movers like Norway to future structural demand from the EU, is strengthening. The bottleneck lies in domestic administrative capacity. For Article 6 to scale in time to support real compliance demand, countries must accelerate the development of the systems that enable them to authorize, track, and report mitigation outcomes with confidence. The data shows where that work is most urgent, and where progress will matter most for future cooperative climate action.

***

Interested in learning more about our coverage related to COP30? Explore our expertise here.

Authors

Petter Aspestrand
petter.aspestrand@rystadenergy.com
Senior Analyst, Carbon Markets Research

Jon Erik Remme
jon.erik.remme@rystadenergy.com
Senior Vice President, Head of Energy Systems