Europe’s carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) market is structurally fragmented. A small group of early movers has built full capture-to-storage systems, while most continental countries remain at the project stage, and France sits in this second tier. Despite its low-carbon power mix, France must cut emissions by about 3% per year, roughly three times its historical pace, to halve emissions by 2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. According to Rystad Energy, this path requires rapid CCUS deployment and deep integration into European transport and storage networks. That said, France is moving forward, with the February 2026 Carbon Contract for Differences (CCfD) awards signalling growing momentum. The main weakness of its CCUS strategy is no longer technological but systemic: capture is expanding faster than transport and storage, creating an imbalance across the value chain.
France as a second tier of Europe’s CCUS efforts
Europe’s CCUS sector is evolving unevenly across various regions, with some countries making quicker progress than others in the industry. The North Sea Region, which comprises the likes of Norway, the UK and Denmark are accelerating CCUS deployment, with a market penetration that exceeds 35%. This is due to factors including greater public support, clear regulation and coordinated strategies compared to other regions in Europe. By contrast, France, much like the rest of Europe still lags in the region. The market adoption of CCUS in France still falls under 10% despite the country’s strong industrial development, access to seaports and expertise from major players such as Air Liquide and TotalEnergies. France currently has no operational storage sites or operational large-scale capture projects, while its regulatory framework is still incomplete, which creates legal uncertainty for developers particularly around storage rights.
Capture is accelerating, but delivery depends on downstream buildout
France is making tangible progress on CCUS, but deployment has so far relied predominantly on EU funding, notably through the Innovation Fund and Horizon Europe. A major national signal was nevertheless sent with the recent selection of projects under the Grands Projets Industriels de Décarbonation (GPID) of France 2030 and the effective launch of the (CCfD) scheme, providing €1.6 billion of support over 15 years. Seven projects were awarded, four of them are hard to abate CCUS projects (one aluminium and three cement plants), representing around 3.5 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) of CO₂ avoided emissions. This confirms that the national target of 4-8 Mtpa of captured CO2 by 2030 is now translating into concrete industrial commitments. Although the project pipeline remains credible on paper, delivery risk remains high and is strongly dependent on the timely development of CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure.
Transport is taking shape, but storage is still outside France’s control
France’s CCUS strategy is built on international cooperation. In 2024, bilateral agreements with Denmark and Norway created a framework for cross-border CO₂ transport and North Sea storage, supported by regulatory and infrastructure work with the UK and the Netherlands. France is now scaling capture through regional hubs, led by Dunkirk, where Eqiom K6 project targets round 0.8 Mtpa by 2030 alongside Lhoist’s CalCC projects under the Airliquid’s D’Artagnan network a Project of Commun and Mututal Interest (PCI/PMI) intitiative.
Transport planning is progressing. The GPID-backed projects add over 3 Mtpa of CO₂ that will need transport and storage. Rhône CO₂ (Elengy, SPSE) would link Vicat’s VAIA project to international routes and Eni’s Ravenna storage hub in Italy. In parallel , Grand Ouest CO₂ (Elengy, NaTran) would connect Heidelberg Materials and Holcim plants to Aramis storage site in the Netherlands, both are (PCI), underlining France’s reliance on cross-border infrastructure. This cluster-based model improves bankability for transport only, but it does not solve storage, which remains largely outside the national perimeter.
France’s 2030 plan therefore depends on third-party storage in the North Sea. As European demand rises, capacity is likely to tighten and competition will intensify , weakening the negotiating position of countries without domestic storage licenses. As a result, France’s progress on capture exposes a key structural weakness: storage is still mostly externalised, leaving projects exposed without secured downstream capacity to de-risk and monetize these projects
Domestic storage must move from potential to permitting
In the longer term, the national objective calls for storing of 30-50 Mtpa of CO₂ stored by 2050, therefore the rapid launch of domestic exploration and at least one national storage site within the next five years is becoming strategically necessary. Although France has significant geological storage potential, notably in offshore saline aquifers and depleted oil and gas fields, these resources remain largely uncharacterised and unused. Depleted fields are estimated at around 0.1 gigatonnes (Gt) of capacity, while saline aquifers could reach roughly 250 Gt, with about 60% assessed as medium to high potential. Rystad Energy also notes that major emission centers near the Paris, Aquitaine and Alpine basins could support regional CCS hubs. Despite this favorable geography, progress remains slow due to weak political direction and persistent public opposition, as illustrated by the failure of the Pycasso project. To avoid long-term dependence on third-party storage, France should permit at least one domestic storage site in the next two years, clarify long-term liability and accelerate infrastructure planning. Denmark provides a reference point, having advanced regulation to assess onshore storage potential in 2022 and opened licensing by 2024.
Ambiguity and political instability in focus.
France is at a crossroads in its carbon management policy. While CO₂ storage is governed by the Mining Code, key issues remain insufficiently defined, including permitting and long-term liability. Slow licensing and unclear rules on interconnection rights and operator responsibilities continue to constrain early projects. Germany has moved faster on storage regulation, and comparable clarity would strengthen France’s downstream segment.
Political instability further worsens existing structural constraints. Parliamentary deadlock and the risk of another dissolution of the National Assembly could delay or reverse legislation, weakening policy continuity. A shift in government – either toward the far right or a left-wing coalition – would likely deprioritise CCUS, with the former camp favoring nuclear and energy sovereignty, while the latter may emphasize renewables and social safeguards at the expense of heavy-industry decarbonization via CCUS. In both cases, the main risk is policy fragmentation, leading to stalled infrastructure, weaker investor confidence and reduced integration with emerging European CCUS networks.
Authors:
Feriel Adjaout
Senior Analyst, CCUS Research
feriel.adjaout@rystadenergy.com
Yvonne Lam
Head of CCUS Research
yeewen.lam@rystadenergy.com
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