Change in Caracas – but will it be enough to revive ailing oil industry?

January was a particularly noisy month for Venezuela. After a sustained period of speculation around Nicolás Maduro and the future of the Chavista leadership, the extraordinary rendition of the now former president into US custody on 3 January pushed the country to the center of the global energy conversation. Markets, policy circles, and oil executives have all began asking if this time might finally be different, and whether Venezuela’s oil sector could plausibly be reopened in a meaningful way after years of isolation, decay, and false starts. Read this special insight from W. Schreiner Parker, Head of Emerging Markets & NOCs at Rystad Energy.

Change in Caracas – but will it be enough to revive ailing oil industry?

The renewed attention tends to default to the headline number of more than 300 billion barrels of oil in the ground. But that figure has always been more political than economic. The volume of oil that is realistically and economically recoverable is far smaller, though still very large by global standards. But what makes Venezuela unique is not just quantity; it’s the nature of the resource. Most of the remaining potential sits in the Faja del Orinoco, an extra-heavy crude belt that is relatively well delineated, well understood, and carries almost no exploration risk. Oil companies do not have to gamble on frontier geology or deepwater wildcats to replace reserves there. The oil is in place, mapped and appraised, which in theory allows for organic reserve replacement without taking on exploration risk, an extremely attractive prospect.

That geological certainty, however, does not translate into economic simplicity. Extra-heavy crude comes with high viscosity, upgrading requirements, blending needs, and infrastructure intensity. Venezuela benefits from a built-in downstream market in the US Gulf Coast, where refineries were explicitly designed to run heavy and sour crudes. That demand is real, and refiners would welcome more Venezuelan barrels, but it is not limitless. Even under optimistic assumptions, the US Gulf Coast’s incremental intake is probably capped somewhere around 700,000 barrels per day. Beyond that, Venezuela would need new refining outlets or new upgrading capacity, both of which require capital and time.

Cost dynamics further complicate the picture. On a marginal basis, current operating costs can look low, especially where existing infrastructure is still functional. That creates the impression that Venezuelan oil is cheap. Full cycle economics tell a very different story. Once the cost of restoring surface facilities, upgrading projects, pipelines, storage, diluent supply, and export systems are included, breakevens rise sharply. Many estimates place sustainable full cycle breakevens in the $70 to $80 per-barrel range or higher. That is before factoring in political risk, fiscal uncertainty, or the cost of capital required to operate in Venezuela at all.

There is also deep uncertainty around state-owned PDVSA itself and its role in a reopened sector. Years of underinvestment, politicization, talent loss, and opaque governance have hollowed out the company operationally and financially.

W. Schreiner Parker, Head of Emerging Markets & NOCs

It is unclear whether PDVSA would act as a capable commercial partner, a passive equity holder, or a political gatekeeper. For international investors, the lack of clarity around PDVSA’s balance sheet, decision-making authority, and operational competence adds another layer of risk. Any revival scenario that keeps PDVSA as a dominant operator would likely struggle to attract capital, while a model that sidelines it would require profound legal and constitutional change. Until PDVSA’s mandate, capabilities, and governance framework are clearly redefined, it will remain a central source of uncertainty rather than a catalyst for recovery.

Even with the aforementioned headwinds, there is a narrow window where production could increase relatively quickly. Workovers, well reactivations, debottlenecking, and basic maintenance could plausibly add 300,000 to 400,000 barrels per day without massive new investment. But moving beyond roughly 1.4 million barrels per day would be a different proposition entirely. Returning to something close to the historical peak near 3 million barrels per day would likely require well worth of $150 billion in cumulative investment over the next 10 to 15 years. That scale of capital does not arrive on hope alone.

This is where history weighs heavily. Major international oil companies have not forgotten nationalizations, forced migrations, and broken contracts. Those memories still shape boardroom risk tolerance and both ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips may suffer from ‘once bitten, twice shy’ mentalities when it comes to re-entering the South American nation. Chevron remains the exception, largely because of its legacy position and ability to operate within narrow legal carve-outs. The current proposed reforms to Venezuela’s hydrocarbons laws being discussed in the National Assembly may help at the margin, but even optimistic readings suggest cost improvements of perhaps 7% to 15%. That is not enough to fundamentally change investment decisions for large-scale development. More importantly, the constitution still prevents foreign companies from holding majority stakes in oil and gas assets, a serious red line for many potential investors.

Layered on top of this is political uncertainty. There is little confidence that the Chavista political machine, even in a post-Maduro configuration, can manage a complex oil sector in a transparent, rules-based, and non-corrupt manner over decades. There is also no certainty that the United States, under President Trump or future administrations, would continue to tolerate large-scale commercial engagement with a Chavista government. Removing Maduro may have been a necessary step to restoring long-term investor confidence, but it is doubtful that it will be considered enough to justify hundreds of billions in capital expenditure.

All things considered it may be a case of the more things change the more they stay the same., Venezuela absolutely has oil that matters, markets that want it, and geology that removes exploration risk. There is opportunity, especially for smaller players, traders, and service companies comfortable operating in high uncertainty environments. But for large international oil companies, the gap between potential and investable reality remains wide. Until legal frameworks, ownership rules, governance credibility, and geopolitical clarity improve in a durable way, Venezuela will continue to sit in that uncomfortable middle ground: rich in resource, constrained by risk, and perpetually just short of a true reopening.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views or beliefs of Rystad Energy. 


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